| Dr. Indrani Talukdar
Turkey’s quest for European Union membership has dragged on for decades. Even Ankara’s indispensable role in shielding Europe from the Syrian refugee crisis has not been enough to open the EU’s doors. The reasons are many, but one issue that consistently blocks the path is the Cyprus issue.
The latest reminder came on 14 November, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, hosting newly elected Northern Cyprus leader Tufan Erhürman in Ankara, doubled down on what Turkey calls the “most realistic solution” to the island’s six-decade-long conflict. For Ankara, the continued coexistence of two separate states is non-negotiable—a position Turkey has held firmly since its 1974 intervention and the subsequent division of the island.
The response from Nicosia was swift. Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides, during a visit to Berlin on 15 November, bluntly stated that Turkey’s long-stalled EU accession bid cannot move forward unless Ankara abandons its two-state vision. His remarks followed a meeting with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who had met Erdogan just weeks earlier in October 2025. The message from the Greek-Cypriot side was unmistakable. The Greek side of the island advocates for a federal settlement.
Nicosia’s position, backed by Greece and anchored in UN resolutions, calls for a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation—one state, one international personality, one citizenship, but two politically equal communities. For Nicosia, this is the only acceptable configuration for reunification.
The stakes, however, extend far beyond the island’s internal politics. Cyprus sits on one of the most strategic crossroads in the Eastern Mediterranean, linking Europe, West Asia, and Africa. It lies directly along the maritime artery connecting the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal and Bab-el-Mandeb, and onward to the Persian Gulf via the Strait of Hormuz and the Pacific through the Strait of Malacca. These choke points underpin global economic and security architecture, making Cyprus central not only to regional geopolitics but also to initiatives such as the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
The island’s hydrocarbon reserves further heighten regional competition, drawing the interest of Turkey, Greece, and several external powers. Cyprus also serves as a critical strategic base—underscored by the UK’s continued military presence in Episkopi and Dhekelia since the 1960s.
Turkey, unwavering in its belief that it acted correctly in 1974 to protect the Turkish Cypriots, has steadily expanded its military footprint in the north. Upgraded infrastructure, the deployment of systems such as the Floral electronic warfare system and Bayraktar TB2 drones. It also plans to develop Bogazi and Karpasia to bolster Turkey’s naval posture, signalling towards an entrenched strategic intent. Unsurprisingly, these developments have deepened Greek-Cypriot insecurity. Nicosia is now lobbying the EU to block any agreement with Ankara and prevent Turkey’s access to the EU’s Security Action for Europe Defence Fund (SAFE).
With Cyprus set to assume the EU presidency in 2026, Turkey’s European dream looks more distant than ever. The unresolved Cyprus question—decades-old yet politically alive—remains one of the hardest knots in Ankara’s path. Whether Turkey will persist with the EU track, or pivot more decisively toward alternative groupings such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS, is now an open question as Ankara recalibrates its place in a shifting global order.
*Dr. Indrani Talukdar is a Fellow at Chintan Research Foundation, New Delhi.
